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The present article purports to shed a new light on ordoliberalism and to explore its role in EU 
competition law. For this purpose, the article analyses the ordoliberal school of thought in its 
historical context and re-conceptualizes its understanding of competition law that has been 
subjected to numerous misrepresentations in the existing literature. The main argument 
presented here is that the ordoliberals perceived a direct link between competition and 
democracy as the normative underpinning of competition law. This competition-democracy 
nexus rests upon the assumption of interdependence between the economic, social and political 
order and indicates that both consequentialist and deontological values legitimize competition 
law and should guide its interpretation. In other words, competition law relies on both input- 
and output-oriented legitimacy. For this reason, ordoliberals praised competition not only for its 
welfare-maximizing qualities but also for its deontological dimension. Thus, competition should 
be protected as such, since it sets the boundaries of economic power and creates the 
preconditions for economic freedom and equality of opportunity. In this sense, competition law 
seeks to ensure that the functioning of the market does not undermine and is conducive to a 
democratic society. For this purpose, though, the pursuit of consequentialist goals must be 
constrained by the protection of the procedural elements of competition. Further, we claim that 
the nexus idea could provide us with a better understanding of EU competition law than a fully-
fledged welfarist approach. Even though, the nexus idea could be traced in the field of Art. 101 
and Art. 102 TFEU in the CJEU’s deontological understanding of competition (i); the Court’s 
balancing between procedural and consequentialist goals (ii), and in the Court’s form-based 
approach (iii) that  is responsive to input from economics (iv). 
INTRODUCTION 
More than thirty years after the publication of Robert Bork’s ground-breaking book in 
1978,1 EU Competition Law is currently facing its own ‘antitrust paradox’. In 
particular, even though the consumer welfare objective has found numerous advocates 
amongst competition law scholars, practitioners and enforcers also on this side of the 
Atlantic,2 the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’) 3 
                                                                                                                                         
*  Both authors are Ph.D. candidates at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The article largely 
benefited from the comments of the participants in the CLasF Conference in Lancaster in April 2015, as 
well as from the thoughtful suggestions of professors Peter Behrens, Petros Mavroidis, Giorgio Monti. All 
errors and omissions remain our own. Any comments are welcome to elias.deutscher@eui.eu or 
stavros.makris@eui.eu. 
1  Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with itself [1978] (Maxwell Macmillan 1993). 
2  Neelie Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choice’ 
(SPEECH/05/512, 15 September 2005) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-
512_en.htm> accessed 23 March 2016. Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, 
p. 7–20. (European Commission) para. 5. 
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continues to be reluctant to follow a strict welfarist approach.4 The scholarly literature 
tends to attribute this apparent paradox to the allegedly on-going influence of 
ordoliberalism on EU Competition Law and the Court’s reasoning.5 Accordingly, 
numerous decisions of the CJEU have been considered as setting unsatisfactory law 
due to their ordoliberal origin. In general, ordoliberalism has been criticized as an 
unworkable, inefficient and formalistic paradigm that prevents EU Competition Law 
from being fully efficient.6  Hence, abandoning the ordoliberal concepts and fully 
endorsing a welfarist approach7 is perceived by the advocates of a ‘more economic 
approach’ as a necessary step for developing a better understanding of the subject 
matter of EU Competition Law, enhancing its legitimacy and informing its legal 
hermeneutics. 
Arguably, ordoliberal thinking has played an important role in the development and the 
application of European competition rules.8 However, it remains unclear what the core 
                                                                                                                                         
3  The ‘EU Courts’ comprise the Court of Justice (‘CoJ’) and the General Court (‘GC’) and collectively make 
up the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’). 
4  The welfarist approach has many different formulations, yet its main topos is that the value of any 
institution derives from its welfare maximization properties. Thus, ‘efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust, 
and competition is a mediate goal that will often be close enough to the ultimate goal to allow the courts go 
no further’. See Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law (University of Chicago Press 2001) 29. Further, efficiency 
could be defined as maximizing total or consumer welfare. For a definition of consumer welfare see Robert 
O'Donoghue and A. J Padilla, The law and economics of Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing 2006) 4. However, 
assessing what is the most workable conception of efficiency is beyond the scope of this study. In this 
respect, we use the terms efficiency and welfare-maximization as interchangeable.  
5  See for instance A. J Padilla and Christian Ahlborn, ‘From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the 
Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis 
(eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 2008). Philip 
Marsden, ‘Some outstanding issues from the European Commission's Guidance on Article 102: Not-so-faint 
echoes of Ordoliberalism’ in Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris (eds), Competition Law and the Enforcement of 
Article 102 (Oxford University Press, USA 2010); Patrick Rey and James S Venit, ‘An Effects-Based 
Approach to Article 102: A Response to Wouter Wils’ (2015) 38(1) World Competition 3; Christian Ahlborn 
and David S Evans, ‘The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy towards 
Dominant Firms in Europe’ (2009) 75(3) Antiturst Law Journal. 
6  Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (CCP Working Paper, University of East 
Anglia 2007) 3; Padilla and Ahlborn (n 5); Rey and Venit (n 5). 
7  It is true that there are numerous welfarist approaches and some of them incorporate elements of 
ordoliberal thinking. Here we use the term in a schematic way as a device allowing us to clarify the main 
features of the ordoliberal approach. 
8  David J Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the 
"New" Europe’ (1994) 42(25) American Journal of Comparative Law 25; David J Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press 1998); 
Kiran K Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013); Peter Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position and its 
Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ (Discussion Paper N°7/15, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg 2015) 33; Heike 
Schweitzer, ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 
EC’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed 
Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 2008) 128. For a different point of view see Akman (n 7); Pinar Akman and 
Hussein Kassim, ‘Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and 
Interpretation of EU Competition Policy*’ (2010) 48(1) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 111; 
Pınar Akman, ‘The Role of ‘Freedom’ in EU Competition Law’ (2014) 34(2) Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars) 
183. For a critical review of Gerber’s and Akman’s account of ordoliberalism and its impact on the drafting 
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conceptual elements of this school of thought are and to what extent it has affected the 
application of the law.  In fact, the label ‘ordoliberalism’ has been adopted as an easy 
explanatory factor for the legal development of EU Competition Law without being 
further analysed.9 Currently, it is simply used as the synonym for out-dated legal 
formalism or weak economic reasoning and as an epithet for everything that does not 
correspond to the more economic approach.10 Nonetheless, the contemporary 
academic debate does not fully answer a quite intuitive question: How is it that this 
anachronistic paradigm, developed more than half a century ago11 in the peripheral 
German university-town of Freiburg and with a tendency to produce poor results, still 
affects EU Competition Law?12 
This paper intends to shed new light on ordoliberalism and provide a new angle to the 
debate. In particular, it aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of ordoliberalism and 
explore their linkages with the existing case law. The main argument presented here is 
that ordoliberalism still influences EU Competition Law in particular by virtue of its 
idea of a competition-democracy nexus. This concept of a direct link between 
competition and democracy, which is deeply entrenched in EU Competition Law, rests 
upon the assumption of interdependence between the economic, social and political 
order.13 Ordoliberalism implies that the form of the economic order does not only bear 
economic consequences, but also affects the social and political sphere. Thus, 
competition rules aim to prevent distortions that could undermine the competitive 
process to the detriment of the public interest. We contend that this ordoliberal idea 
offers a solid basis for understanding European competition rules and strengthening 
their legitimacy, for it can explain the law as it currently stands and orientate its 
interpretation.  
The argument is developed in three steps. First, we briefly provide a theoretical 
definition of the notions of democracy and the competition-democracy nexus (I). 
Secondly, we analyse the different dimensions of the competition democracy nexus in 
                                                                                                                                         
of EU competition rules see Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position and its 
Impact on Article 102 TFEU’.  
9  As observed for instance by Mel Marquis, ‘Introduction, Summary, Remarks’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 
and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 
2008) xxxi, fn. 16.  
10  Rey and Venit (n 5) 23. 
11  See as ‘founding-text’ of the Ordoliberal paradigm or the so-called Freiburger Schule: Franz Böhm, Walter 
Eucken and Hans Großmann-Doerth, ‘Unsere Aufgabe (The Ordoliberal Manifesto) - 1936’ in Nils 
Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte zur Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008). 
12  Arguably, the influence of ordoliberalism is not confined to EU Competition law, but currently also 
orientates the EU’s economic and monetary policy. See in this sense The Economist, ‘Germany and 
Economics - Of Rules and Order - German Ordoliberalism Has Had a Big Influence on Policy During The 
Euro Crisis’ (9 May 2015); Francois Denord, Rachel Knaebel and Pierre Rimbert, ‘L'Ordolibéralisme 
Allemand, Cage de Fer pour le Vieux Continent’ Le Monde Diplomatique (1 August 2015). This aspect of 
ordoliberalism, however, goes beyond the scope of this inquiry and according to the authors is not 
necessarily related to the ordoliberal paradigm in EU Competition Law. 
13  Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Mohr Siebeck 2004) 16, 304-308; Frank Maier-Rigaud, ‘On 
the Normative Foundations of Competition Law - Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to 
Compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Elgar 2012) 137. 
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their historical context (II). This nexus, the argument goes, constitutes the underlying 
rationale of the ordoliberal understanding of competition and its law. The third part  
explores how the ordoliberal nexus influences the application of Articles 101 and 102 
of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) (III). This analysis seeks 
to illustrate in what sense the ordoliberal paradigm explains the law as it is and how it 
guides its interpretation. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that the ordoliberal 
conception of the competition-democracy nexus allows for an economically informed 
categorical thinking. In this regard, ordoliberal thinking could guide and delimit the 
more economic approach by proposing a framework capable of accommodating the 
concept of efficiency and attributing to it its due value. This may explain the Court’s 
continuous reluctance to adopt a purely welfare-oriented reasoning in competition 
cases. 
I. SETTING THE SCENE 
Anyone opening nowadays an antitrust textbook, will probably soon discover that 
consumer welfare constitutes, according to the predominant view, the central goal of 
EU Competition Law.14 From this perspective, the claim that there is a link between 
competition (law) and democracy seems to be rather counterintuitive. However, the 
European Competition Law paradox described above shows that the so-called more 
economic approach fails to fully explain the normative underpinnings and the 
application of EU Competition Law. In other words, there is an important 
contradiction between the precepts of the dominant theory of antitrust and the practice 
of EU competition law. Whereas, the more economic approach criticizes the 
divergence of EU Competition law from the normative goal of welfare maximization 
and pushes for legal reform, our account of the ordoliberal paradigm offers a different 
angle.  
The concept of a ‘competition-democracy’ nexus, we argue, provides an alternative 
framework for analyzing and explaining EU Competition Law. This framework 
provides a more complete and coherent account and a normative basis for EU 
Competition Law than the more economic approach. The key point of the argument 
put forward in this paper is that the democratic legitimacy of competition law relies on 
a combination of what Fritz Scharpf calls ‘input-oriented legitimacy’ and ‘output-
oriented legitimacy’.15 These two categories mirror two dimensions of democratic self-
government and show how different principles, goals and institutional rules contribute 
to the democratic legitimacy of an institution.16 In addition, these two categories 
                                                                                                                                         
14  O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 5) 4; Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 30; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition 
law (Oxford University Press 2012) 19; Kroes (n 3). 
15  Fritz W Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999) 2. 
16  We use the term institution in the sense of Douglas North: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.” Douglas 
C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990) 3. 
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comprise a way of conceptualizing competition law that is reflected in the Court’s 
reasoning. 
The input-oriented legitimacy of a democratic system refers to what Abraham Lincoln 
called ‘government by the people’.17 It is based on certain institutional rules ensuring 
the democratic decision-making as self-determination of the citizens. Thus, input-
oriented legitimacy refers to democracy as participation and expression of the general 
will of the citizens.18 It also relies on the procedural safeguards of the democratic 
process, which ensure equality of opportunity, individual freedom, autonomy and the 
fundamental rights of the constituents.  
Conversely, the category of output-oriented legitimacy refers to what Lincoln described 
as ‘government for the people’.19 This form of democratic legitimacy is based on 
institutional rules, which enable a political system to achieve consequentialist goals in 
the general interest, while respecting certain limits of political power.20 Such limits 
constitute in turn the precondition of input-legitimacy, for they prevent deontological 
values, which constitute the very basis of the democratic process, from being sacrificed 
in the pursuit of a consequentialist goal. Thus, output-oriented legitimacy is related to 
consequentialism and suggests that an institution or a polity is justified as long as it 
achieves the greatest net satisfaction summed over all the individuals subjected to it.21 
Nonetheless, output-oriented legitimacy should also take into consideration the 
Lockean idea of the ‘boundaries of power’.22 This implies that the quest for achieving 
‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’23 is constrained by the boundaries set 
by the input-oriented legitimacy. Thus, every institution or polity must strike a balance 
between the achievement of outcome-oriented goals and the protection of 
deontological goals, so as to ensure its democratic legitimacy.  
These two categories of input- and output-oriented legitimacy allow us to 
operationalize the ordoliberal conception of the competition-democracy nexus. First, 
by applying the concept of input- and output-oriented legitimacy to competition, we 
argue that competition constitutes an institution, which relies on different forms of 
democratic legitimacy. Secondly, we contend that the nexus concept sets forth criteria 
indicating how a certain institutional form of competition contributes to the legitimacy 
of a democratic political system.  
                                                                                                                                         
17  Scharpf (n 15) 2. 
18  ibid 8 ft. 2; 10f. 
19  ibid 2. 
20  ibid 6, 13. 
21  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [1971]: Revised Edition (Harvard University Press 2003) 22. 
22  John Locke, The second treatise of government [1689] (Reclam 2012) Chapter XI, § 135, 218. 
23  James H Burns and Herbert LA Hart, (eds), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: A Comment on the 
Commentaries and A Fragment on Government (Clarendon Press 1977) 393. 
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II. THE ORDOLIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE COMPETITION-DEMOCRACY 
NEXUS 
The ordoliberal nexus between competition and democracy can have two dimensions.24 
First, this relationship can be negative, implying that the distortions of competition 
might have a serious impact on a democratic polity and vice versa. Secondly, this 
relationship can also take the form of a positive link where competition is conducive to 
a democratic polity and vice versa. 
i.  The negative dimension 
In the first place, the ordoliberals formulated the competition-democracy nexus in a 
negative way. In light of the historical experience of the Weimar Republic and the 
Third Reich in Germany, they believed that the elimination of competition could 
undermine democracy in the political sphere and facilitate the rise of totalitarianism.25 
This negative link drew on the experience of the cartelisation and monopolisation of 
the German economy since the 1870s.26 During the Weimar Republic, the incapability 
of laissez-faire liberalism to control the concentration of private economic power 
entailed the destruction of competition and undermined the social and political 
preconditions of democracy. According to the ordoliberal account, the weak Weimarian 
state failed inter alia because it allowed the private market participants to decide on the 
‘rules of the game’. As a result, various private actors were able to exercise coercion on 
others by restricting their rights and freedoms and unduly exclude them from the 
market.27 Consequently, market participants could not freely participate in the market 
on equal terms, while powerful actors could effectively violate other citizens’ economic 
rights, freedoms and opportunities. This excessive concentration and abuse of private 
economic power impaired competition and undermined the input-oriented legitimacy 
of the market process. For this reason, ordoliberals concluded that laissez-faire capitalism 
is inherently unstable28 and that competition law should prevent economic freedom 
from destroying its own prerequisites.29 
                                                                                                                                         
24  We agree with Prof. Behren’s reservations against associating ordoliberalism exclusively with the Freiburg 
School and partially share his view that ordoliberalism is a dynamic and diverse school of thought, rather 
than a monolithic paradigm. See Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position 
and its Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ (n 8) 12. The idea of a ‘competition-democracy’ nexus has, however, 
initially been coined by the members of the Freiburg School and also constitutes the normative DNA of the 
understanding of competition law of second and third generation of ordoliberals. 
25  Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" 
Europe’ (n 8) 28. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978-1979 (Gallimard; 
Seuil 2004) 80. 
26  Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and European Competition Law with Special 
Reference to the EU Commission's Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ in Lorenzo F Pace (ed), European 
Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission's Guidance on Article 102 (Edward Elgar 2011) 34. 
27  Heike Knortz, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik: Eine Einführung in Ökonomie und Gesellschaft der ersten 
Deutschen Republik (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2010) 32, 81; Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik 
(Mohr Siebeck 2004) 53–55. 
28  In this respect, the ordoliberals are much closer to classical liberalism than modern libertarians or 
proponents of laissez-faire capitalism, since the portrayal of classical liberals as extreme opponents of 
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In parallel, powerful market players were able to convert their economic into political 
power and corrupt via interest capture various political institutions. Hence, the 
cartelisation and monopolisation of the German Economy also entailed, according to 
the ordoliberals, important social and political consequences, for it led to economic, 
social and political ‘group anarchy’ (Gruppenanarchie) between powerful interest groups.30 
These economic phenomena transformed the Weimarian economic and political system 
into a ‘neo-feudal’ system, undermining the independence of the state, as well as the 
supporting social structures of democracy.31 Therefore, the concentration of market 
power did not only jeopardize the competitive process, but also harmed the input-
oriented legitimacy of the political system by curtailing the procedural guarantees of 
equal participation in the political game. Such development has significant ramifications 
also on the political rights of the citizens.32  
In the same vein, the ordoliberals contended that laissez-faire liberalism enabled the rise 
of the centrally planned economy associated with the Nazi Regime.33 In their eyes, the 
increasing economic concentration and the subsequent hostility to competition led to a 
deep crisis of the German economy that undermined the legitimacy of the existing 
economic and political order. This raised popular demand for an intrusive role of the 
state in the economy and for strong political leadership. As a consequence, an 
increasing number of private cartels and monopolies was brought under the control of 
the state or was directly socialized.34 Yet, instead of solving the problem of excessive 
concentration of market power, these measures entailed the coalition between private 
and public economic power that paved the way for the establishment of a centrally 
planned economy.35 At the same time, the state relied heavily on cartels and 
monopolies as transmission belts for the implementation of its central economic 
                                                                                                                                         
government intervention is fundamentally misguided. See Lanny Ebenstein, Chicagonomics: The Evolution of 
Free Market Economics (St. Martin's Press 2015) 1–18. 
29  Wernhardt Möschel, ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View’ in Alan T Peacock, Hans Willgerodt 
and Daniel Johnson (eds), German neo-liberals and the social market economy (Macmillan for the Trade Policy 
Research Centre 1989) 149. 
30  Franz Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (Nomos 1980) 68. 
31  Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 27) 326. Franz Böhm, ‘Democracy and Economic Power in Cartel 
and Monopoly in Modern Law [1961]’ in Daniel A Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp (eds), The making of 
competition policy: Legal and economic sources (Oxford University Press 2013) 273. Knortz (n 27) 193. 
32  Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 30) 68. 
33  Leonhard Miksch, ‘Versuch eines liberalen Programms [1949]’ in Nils Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte zur 
Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 165; Leonhard Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - 
Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (Verlag Helmut Küpper 1947) 212–217; Foucault (n 25) 110. 
34  Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 27) 334; Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and 
European Competition Law with Special Reference to the EU Commission's Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ 
(n 26) 36. 
35  Walter Eucken, ‘Das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Macht’ in Walter Eucken and Walter Oswalt (eds), 
Wirtschaftsmacht und Wirtschaftsordnung: Londoner Vorträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik und zwei Beiträge zur 
Antimonopolpolitik (Lit 2001) 16. Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 27) 293. 
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planning.36 Simultaneously, mighty economic groups continuously wielded their 
economic power in the political sphere37 and reaped benefits from their support for the 
rising Nazi regime.38  
To put it succinctly, the Nazi regime used a consequentialist discourse so as to reduce 
the institutional checks-and-balances that limited economic and political power. As a 
result, the rule of law was undermined and citizens were deprived of their political and 
economic freedoms.39 These factors enabled the emergence of powerful private actors 
that supported the rise of a totalitarian regime.40 The excessive concentration of 
economic power reinforced and was reinforced by the excessive concentration of 
political power in the hands of the State.  
ii. The positive dimension 
It is, however, important to notice, that the Freiburg School did not limit itself only to 
the formulation of the abovementioned negative link. On the contrary, the ordoliberals 
tried to find out how competition as a specific institutional form of the market was 
compatible with and conducive to democracy.41 Contrary to the image conveyed by the 
scholarly literature, ordoliberalism does not provide an obsolete ‘doomsday theory’.42 
What it does do is establish a positive relationship between competition and 
democracy. This positive link epitomises in the three ordoliberal goals of competition, 
namely welfare-maximisation, economic freedom and procedural justice, which 
positively contribute to the legitimacy of competition itself as well as of the democratic 
polity. 
Surprisingly, and contrary to the common critique that ordoliberals were incapable of 
taking into account economic knowledge and accommodating efficiency 
                                                                                                                                         
36  Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and European Competition Law with Special Reference to the 
EU Commission's Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ (n 26) 37; Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer 
Wettbewerbsordnung (n 33) 213. 
37  Walter Eucken and T. W Hutchison, ‘On the Theory of the Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis 
of the German Experiment. Part II’ (1948) 15(59) Economica 173, 182. Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - 
Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (n 33) 213. The support of the rising NSDAP and its economic 
governance by powerful German industrialists and cartels is also discussed by historical research. David 
Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis (Holmes & Meier 1986) 317–324. 
Adam Tooze, ‘The German National Economy in an Era of Crisis and War, 1917-1945’ in Helmut W Smith 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford University Press 2011) 411.  
38  Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market 
(Hart Publishing 1997) 40. 
39  Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 28) 309, 332-334. Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft 
[1971] (n 30) 82. 
40  Walter Eucken and Walter Oswalt (eds), Wirtschaftsmacht und Wirtschaftsordnung: Londoner Vorträge zur 
Wirtschaftspolitik und zwei Beiträge zur Antimonopolpolitik (Lit 2001) 19–20. Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der 
Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 31) 83; Walter Eucken, ‘Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des 
Kapitalismus’ (1932) 36 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 297, 298-300, 308; Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der 
Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 30) 83. 
41  Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 30) 87; Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 
28) 14. 
42  Padilla and Ahlborn (n 5) 80. 
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considerations,43 this positive link also rests upon the goal of welfare maximisation. 
Indeed, the examination of ordoliberal thinkers’ original texts reveals that they clearly 
advocated in favour of competition as the most efficient instrument to increase total 
welfare.44 By increasing welfare, competition contributes to the general interest of a 
democratic polity and, thereby, enhances the output-oriented legitimacy of the system. 
Nonetheless, unlike the welfarist approach, the Freiburg School did not perceive 
efficiency as the sole and ultimate goal of competition. Instead, it underlined that the 
efficiency-enhancing nature of competition must be reconciled with other goals 
ensuring a humane, free and democratic economic order.45 Hence, efficiency is 
conceived as an important ‘by-product’46 of the competitive process, rather than the 
ultimate goal of competition.  
Consequently, the ordoliberals stressed not only the value of efficiency but also 
underlined the importance of economic freedom. They conceived economic freedom in 
a multidimensional way as private autonomy, freedom of choice for consumers and 
producers47 and freedom to compete (market access).48 Economic freedom constitutes, 
pursuant to the ordoliberal idea of interdependence49 between the economic, social and 
political order, the precondition and counterpart of other fundamental and political 
rights such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, as well as the right to 
vote.50 From this perspective, the exercise of economic freedom plays a similar role to 
that of political rights: it is essential for the good functioning of a democratic polity.51 
Therefore, the individual citizen cannot entirely enjoy her democratic economic and 
political fundamental rights if her autonomy is limited in the economic sphere by the 
exercise of arbitrary economic power by other citizens or the state.52 At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                         
43  James S Venit, ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier - Fighting Fire with Fire’ (2004) 28(4) Fordham International 
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the ordoliberal concern for ensuring a socially sustainable economic order and the 
republican ideal of equal rights and freedoms also explain why economic freedom 
should not be perceived as an absolute and unrestricted individual right.53 Thus, the 
exercise of economic freedom must be allowed as far as it does not undermine other 
citizens’ economic freedom. 54 
In this respect, the dispersal of public and private economic power is an important 
feature of both competition and democracy, since it guarantees individual autonomy in 
both aspects, as economic and political freedom.55 On the one hand, by setting bounds 
to economic power, competition law warrants a free and fair competitive process. On 
the other hand, the dispersal of economic power through competition ensures the 
integrity and impartiality of the political institutions, for it makes interest capture less 
likely.56 By imposing checks and balances on private and public market power, 
competition protects political institutions and decision-making processes and 
guarantees an inviolable sphere of private activity.57 Accordingly, competition as 
conceived by the ordoliberals not only stimulates welfare-maximizing behaviour, but 
constitutes above all the ‘most remarkable and ingenious instrument for reducing 
power known in history’.58 
Moreover, the ordoliberal paradigm assumes that a competitive economic order is the 
precondition for the realisation of an open, pluralistic market. Accordingly, competition 
is perceived as fair, as long as market actors have equal opportunities to participate in 
the economic process.59 For ordoliberals, the abuse of private or public market power 
leads to the arbitrary exclusion of market participants, and, thereby, reduces their 
opportunities to participate in the competitive process.60 In contrast, a well-functioning 
competitive market leads only to the exclusion of the less efficient market players. 
Therefore, in the absence of abuses of excessive economic power, the competitive 
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process guarantees economic freedom as equality of all,61 and ensures that economic 
inequalities are only the result of different economic performance of the individual 
market participants and not the outcome of arbitrary power.62 
Pursuant to the ordoliberals competition constitutes a ‘plebiscitary’63 coordination 
process for the allocation of resources resting upon the guarantee of freedom and 
equality of opportunity. Consumers’ choice steers the economy in the same way as 
citizens’ votes influence political processes.64 As long as no market participant is 
unfairly excluded from the process of competition, the results of competition are 
similar to the outcomes of a democratic procedure legitimised as a fair expression of 
the ‘volonté générale’.65 In this respect, the ordoliberal paradigm conceives competition 
itself as a democratic and pluralistic economic institution. This means that it forges a 
positive link between competition and democracy. Ordoliberal competition 
accommodates the consequentialist goal of welfare maximization on the one hand, and 
the two procedural goals of economic freedom and fairness on the other. Hence, 
competition reinforces a democratic regime in a composite way; it enhances the input-
oriented and the output-oriented legitimacy of the economic process. Competition 
makes the market an institution conducive to democracy. Competition is, therefore, 
from the ordoliberal perspective, an important, but not sufficient precondition and 
element of democracy.  
The welfarist approach contends that democracy can claim legitimate authority due to 
its welfare maximizing properties.66 Competition is legitimate as long as it ensures 
beneficial outcomes for the democratic polity. By contrast, the procedural goals of 
economic freedom and fairness hint towards a deontological understanding of 
competition as a process. Such an understanding corresponds to a procedural 
conception of democracy, which cannot exist without the protection of certain 
deontological goals such as freedom, autonomy and equality of opportunity. Thus, the 
ordoliberal paradigm, without ignoring the welfare-enhancing qualities of competition, 
emphasizes its procedural dimension. Such an approach underlines that in certain 
occasions the output-oriented mechanisms (consequentialist values) are inadequate to 
legitimize the system. Input-oriented mechanisms (deontological values) should delimit 
the latter, and, thereby, ensure that the pursuit of certain outcomes does not lead to 
occasions where the existential conditions of the system could be undermined.  
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Nevertheless, it is important to notice that while ordoliberals assume that the 
protection of economic freedom under normal circumstances also enhances welfare 
and efficiency,67 they clearly prioritize in case of conflict the procedural goals of 
economic freedom and fairness over the consequentialist ones.68 In this respect, 
ordoliberalism clearly differs from the welfarist approach, which derives the legitimacy 
of competition exclusively from its welfare-maximizing properties.69 More 
provocatively, by transposing into the economic sphere the Lockean idea of the 
necessity for democracy bounds of power, the ordoliberals made sure that economic 
freedom was not sacrificed in the quest for beneficial outcomes. By contrast, the 
welfarist approach rejects any form of limitation of the pursuit of efficiency. Every 
restriction of freedom or fairness violation could be legitimized on the basis of welfare 
maximization. Nonetheless, underplaying the role of freedom and fairness may turn 
competition into an unjust institution.  
iii. Institutional rules and a form-based approach as precondition of a positive 
nexus 
This account of both dimensions of the οrdoliberal competition-democracy nexus, 
however, raises the question of how the οrdoliberals get from the negative dimension, 
where the deterioration of competition undermines democracy, to the positive 
dimension, where competition contributes to democracy. In fact, the experience of two 
negative historical examples – laissez-faire liberalism and centrally planned economy70 – 
made ordoliberals typify two types of failing economic organisation that had also 
detrimental political ramifications.  
From these experiences the οrdoliberals gained the insight that the main reason for the 
failure of competition and the deteriorating effects of economic power on democracy 
was the insufficient application of the rule of law in economic matters.71 In fact, they 
recognised that competition as an ordering principle of the economy suffers from its 
fragile nature. Competition could only exist and deploy its beneficial effects in form of 
the positive nexus under certain conditions.72 For the οrdoliberals the competitive 
market did not just happen; it is an institutional structure that follows certain political 
and legal decision-making. Contrary to the neo-liberal conception of the market as a 
‘natural order’,73 a competitive market economy could not be established and sustained 
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by the mere unrestricted interplay of market forces.74 To put it differently, competition 
as ‘rules of the game’ cannot be guaranteed by the ‘market game’ itself in form of a 
spontaneous order. Instead, competitive markets could be achieved only via an 
artificial, state-created legal arrangement, which incorporates certain rules and 
organizing principles and provides for a certain form of the economic process.75 Thus, 
competition and markets are considered to be products of deliberate political and legal 
action by the state.76 
The legal rules set forth an institutional framework that is based on the ordoliberal 
notions of the ‘private law society’ (Privatrechtsgesellschaft) 77 and the ‘Economic 
Constitution’. (Wirtschaftsverfassung). On the one hand, the institutions of private law 
enable economic exchanges by providing the basic means for autonomous economic 
planning. At the same time, they delimit the legitimate scope of private autonomy.78 
Thus, from the equality of all before the (private) law follows that equal freedom of 
each constitutes a limit for the freedom of every other individual.79 On the other hand, 
the ‘Economic Constitution’ represents a fundamental economic policy decision 
(ordnungspolitische Gesamtentscheidung) in favour of a specific form of a competitive 
economic order.80 By circumscribing the scope of legitimate private action and by 
imposing the rule of law not only on the state, but also on all private market players, the 
‘Economic Constitution’ protects the institution of competition, as well as the 
economic freedom of the market participants.81  
The positive link between competition and democracy also materializes in the 
ordoliberal form-based approach towards competition and in particular in their 
conception of competition as a rivalrous market structure.82 By virtue of its procedural, 
non-hierarchical characteristics competition constitutes from an ordoliberal perspective 
the sole market regime that is compatible with democracy, for it guarantees for each 
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market participant an equal sphere of autonomy on which no other market player may 
impinge.83 This idea of competition as a non-hierarchical and freedom-enhancing 
process is intertwined with the protection of a competitive market structure ensuring 
rivalry.84 Only the preservation of a market structure characterised by a sufficient 
number of players can safeguard competition as a checks-and-balances system where 
the players constrain each other’s market power and preserve consumers’ freedom of 
choice.85 
As a result, certain categories of market conduct are incompatible with this ideal type of a 
non-hierarchical process of coordination of autonomous plans, since they may 
undermine the economic freedom or equality of opportunity of other market 
participants. For this purpose, the ordoliberals distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate categories of competition in the form of business practices. This distinction 
is epitomised in the dichotomy between ‘performance competition’ (Leistungswettbewerb) 
and ‘impediment competition’ (Behinderungswettbewerb).86 The category of performance 
competition encompasses business conduct based on economic performance in terms 
of lower prices, higher quality or product variety or innovation. Conversely, business 
practices to which enterprises could only recur thanks to considerable market power 
fall under the category of ‘hindrance competition’ when they result in an unduly 
exclusion of competitors. These practices are deemed illegitimate due to their 
hierarchy-inducing coercive nature.87  
In this setting, the form-based approach establishes ex ante certain categories of 
business behaviour such as cartel agreements, fidelity rebates, predatory pricing, price-
discrimination, refusals to deal as illegal,88 based on the presumption that they are 
harmful to competition by restricting the rights of market participants in terms of 
economic freedom, equality of opportunity and/or since they reduce welfare. 
Undoubtedly, these presumptions remain rebuttable and could be amended or 
abandoned in light of emerging economic knowledge.  
Nonetheless, this form-based approach clearly differs from a fully-fledged welfarist 
approach, which relies exclusively on the utilitarian calculus of welfare maximization as 
the only criterion for legitimizing legal rules and assessing the legality of economic 
conduct.89 As a consequence, while such an approach argues in favour of appraising 
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merely the actual welfare-maximizing or -reducing consequences of a business practice, 
the ordoliberals also consider the conformity of such practices with the other values of 
the competitive process.90 By balancing different goals and values in order to ensure the 
input- and output-oriented legitimacy of the competitive process, the ordoliberal 
approach does not rely solely on balancing welfare-enhancing and -reducing effects, but 
rather carries out a balancing test of conflicting individual rights, freedoms and 
interests. 91 
III. THE COMPETITION-DEMOCRACY NEXUS AND EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW 
In this part, we argue that despite the current orthodoxy according to which 
competition law is desirable solely for its welfare-maximizing properties, the structure 
of EU Competition Law and the case law of the Court seem to be compatible in many 
instances with an ordoliberal understanding of competition law92 and the idea of a 
competition-democracy nexus. The argument made here is not that the Court relies 
exclusively on ordoliberalism when deciding competition cases. On the contrary, the 
Court’s reasoning often appears to be quite eclectic, for it often oscillates between 
ordoliberal concepts and a more economic approach.93 Moreover, inconsistencies in 
the Court’s case law94 hint towards inner tensions. In fact, in several cases the Court 
seems divided between different approaches rather than monolithically endorsing a 
clearly ordoliberal or a ‘more economic’ position.95 The welfarist rationale of the more 
economic approach, however, fails to explain this eclectic approach and the Court’s 
inner tensions. The ordoliberal concept of a competition-democracy nexus might, 
therefore, complement and enhance our understanding of EU Competition Law and 
the Court’s reasoning. 
The influence and persistence of the ordoliberal idea of a link between competition and 
democracy could be traced in the field of Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU primarily in  the 
CJEU’s deontological understanding of competition based on its procedural 
characteristics (i); the Court’s balancing of procedural and consequentialist goals (ii); the 
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Court’s form-based approach (iii); that could also be responsive to input from 
economics (iv). From this perspective, the idea of a competition-democracy nexus may 
explain better the content and interpretation of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU than does a 
fully-fledged welfarist approach. Moreover, contrary to what is adduced by the 
proponents of the ‘more economic approach’, the ordoliberal competition-democracy 
nexus is not necessarily bound to an economically illiterate formalistic approach, but 
could accommodate current economic thinking. Hence, even though ordoliberalism 
does not offer a complete analytical model,96 its conception of a competition-
democracy nexus allows for economically informed categorical thinking and in that way 
it could be a first step towards a European School in Competition Law. 
i. The CJEU’s ordoliberal understanding of competition 
Firstly, the ordoliberal idea of a competition-democracy nexus can be traced in CJEU’s 
institutional understanding of competition. In the field of Art. 101 TFEU, the Court 
stressed in T-Mobile Netherlands that ‘Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of 
the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers, but also to protect the structure of the market and thus 
competition as such’.97 Similarly, with regard to Art. 102 TFEU the Court highlighted 
already in Continental Can that ‘[t]he provision [of Art. 86] is not only aimed at practices 
which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental 
to them through their impact on an effective competition structure, such as is 
mentioned in Article 3 (f) of the Treaty’.98  
The Court has resisted the welfarist orientation of the Commission’s modernization 
initiative.99 In one of the first cases after the issuance of the Commission’s Guidance 
Paper on Art. 82 the Court re-affirmed that the function of competition rules is ‘to 
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, 
individual undertakings and consumers’.100 By recognizing that margin squeeze is a 
stand-alone practice, the Court highlighted that consumer welfare is not the sole goal of 
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EU Competition law.101 Protecting the competitive process implied that the very 
existence of margin squeeze, absent of any objective justification, was abusive, without 
the need to establish that the retail prices to end-users were in themselves excessive or 
predatory.102 This followed from the fact that Art. 102 TFEU does not focus 
exclusively on practices that directly harm consumers, but also aims at protecting 
consumers from practices that indirectly harm them due to their negative impact on 
competition.103 In a similar vein, the Court also starkly rejected in GlaxoSmithKline the 
General Court’s104 attempt to adopt consumer-welfare as the exclusive standard for 
finding a restriction of competition.105 
The Court’s approach, thus, does not fall short of the ordoliberal topos that 
competition is not only a means to achieve consumer welfare.106 Competition is also 
perceived as an end the protection of which is in the ‘public interest’ of a democratic 
society. Hence, this understanding of competition clearly embodies the ordoliberal 
perception of competition as a process and institution that preserves a rivalrous market 
structure and has an intrinsic value.107 Such a structure simultaneously guarantees and 
promotes both outcome-oriented and procedural goals and values that are 
indispensable for a democratic economic order. The Court’s wording suggests that the 
consequentialist goal of welfare and the deontological values of freedom and equality of 
opportunity are equally important for competition. Such a value pluralistic approach 
implies that both goals should be protected on equal terms and that there is no 
hierarchy among these independent values within the European Competition Law 
framework, contrary to what the welfarist approach maintains.108 Instead, it clearly 
underscores the ordoliberal idea that both types of goals must be balanced, so as to 
guarantee the input- and output-oriented legitimacy of competition as a democratic 
institution. 
Conceptualizing competition as an institution based also on deontological values is 
fundamentally different from a welfarist approach. According to the latter, all social 
institutions should be evaluated exclusively depending on their consequences on 
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(Cambridge University Press 2014) 1048–1049.  
106  See AG Kokott’s Opinion in Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others (n 97) paras. 43, 58. 
107  See in this regard AG Kokott’s understanding of competition as “structure of the market” and “institution” 
ibid para. 58.  
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individuals’ well-being.109 In this respect, the value of competition derives entirely from 
its welfare maximization properties and is justified as long as it increases society’s 
welfare.110 Thus, EU Competition Law should be perceived as an instrument for 
enhancing welfare without having value per se.111 Such an approach bases the 
legitimacy of competition only on its output-oriented characteristics, without taking 
into account the importance of its procedural characteristics and its role within a 
democratic polity.  
On the contrary, the ordoliberal paradigm maintains that competition constitutes an 
end in itself, separate from the outcomes that may be produced for consumers, 
economic efficiency, market integration or industrial growth. The process itself 
contains an inherent value and cannot be abolished, even if it is not always the most 
effective mode to reach welfare maximization.112 In light of the above, it becomes clear 
that by securing the independence of competitors’ decision-making capacity, the law 
protects individual autonomy as a prerequisite of the competitive process.113  
Moreover, the Court’s reference to a competitive market structure makes the 
ordoliberal concept of the ‘competitive process’ more tangible as a deontological goal. 
Competition is perceived as a sort of checks-and-balances system in which the 
independent decisions of individual market players constrain each other’s exercise of 
economic power and create a form of interdependence between them. Furthermore, a 
sufficient degree of diversity of market players is necessary for the consumers to be able 
to choose freely. Accordingly, the competitive process relies on the preservation of a 
certain degree of rivalry and thus on a certain number of at the same time independent 
and interdependent players that reciprocally constrain their exercise of legitimate 
economic freedom and power.  
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This might explain why in its recent Post Danmark II judgement the Court points out 
the importance of even less-efficient competitors for competition in a highly 
concentrated market characterised by significant entry barriers.114 In light of the 
existing case law, this point is innovative. For instance, in TeliaSonera, the Court held 
that the dominant company’s margin squeeze had a likely exclusionary effect, for it 
excluded equally efficient undertakings.115 In this case, the Court used a cost-based test, 
in order to determine the boundaries of freedom of the market players and ensure 
equality of opportunity among rivals.116 Yet, in Post Danmark II117 the Court recognized 
the limitations of the as efficient competitor test and took a step forward.118 
Accordingly, the goal of EU Competition Law to protect competition as such may 
reflect a fundamental presumption in favour of market structures that are compatible 
with and conducive to a democratic polity.  
ii.  Balancing deontological and consequentialist goals 
Another element of the influence of the nexus idea on the application of Art. 101 and 
102 TFEU is reflected in the balancing of consequentialist and deontological values as a 
precondition of the competitive process’ input- and output-oriented legitimacy. The 
ordoliberal framework is based on and ensures the values of freedom and equality of 
opportunity, which normally also lead to the maximisation of total and/or consumer 
welfare. However, in the case of conflict, the ordoliberals underline the necessity of 
striking a balance between deontological and consequentialist goals, so as to ensure an 
alignment between output-oriented and input-oriented legitimacy. 
This idea explains the inner rationale and the structure of Art. 101 TFEU better than 
does a fully-fledged welfarist approach. The wording of Art. 101(1) TFEU in its very 
general terms catches agreements between firms that impose restrictions of 
competition. This, though, does not mean that any restriction in the freedom of action 
of an undertaking constitutes simultaneously a restriction of competition.119 Such an 
interpretation would be absurd since restraints of trade are the essence of any 
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contract.120 Accordingly, Art. 101(1) TFEU prohibits any undue restriction of the 
economic freedom of the parties or other market participants.121 This means that what 
at first sight may seem as a restriction of competition is not considered as such after a 
closer look.122 Reduction of competition between the parties does not necessarily have 
an impact on competition in the market.123 This is why restrictions of competition 
cannot be established in abstracto and should always be assessed against the background 
of the competition that would have existed in their absence.124 Therefore, the 
prohibition of Art. 101(1) is not incompatible with the ordoliberal understanding of 
competition as a process whereby equal and autonomous market actors participate in 
the economy without overwhelming constraints from private and public power.125  
At the same time, Art. 101(3) TFEU provides the conditions under which a restriction 
of freedom could be justified and provides guidelines for the balancing of economic 
freedom and welfare. In particular, pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU a vertical or 
horizontal restriction of competition qualifies for an exemption from the general 
prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU as long as it satisfies two positive and two negative 
conditions. The two positive conditions refer to the economic benefit and the 
consumer benefit of the anti-competitive agreement or practice, whereas the two 
negative conditions include the indispensability of the agreement for the realization of 
the relevant objectives and the absence of a substantial elimination of competition in 
the relevant market.126 Given that restrictions of competition could be excused in virtue 
of their redeeming values, it becomes apparent that Art. 101 TFEU was designed in 
such a way so as to allow balancing the consequentialist and deontological values of 
competition.  
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In addition, the fourth requirement of non-elimination of substantial competition is 
based on the idea that economic freedom and the competitive process have an inherent 
value that cannot be fully attributed to actual beneficial consequences. This criterion 
calls for an analysis of the competitive restraints imposed on the parties, the remaining 
competitive pressures on the market and the impact of the agreement on 
competition.127 Consequently, certain restrictions of freedom could not be justified no 
matter what the utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits may say. The upshot is that a 
market structure based on rivalry is not only considered an essential driver of economic 
efficiency, but also as a procedural safeguard of a non-hierarchical coordination of the 
economy that is compatible with democracy.128 Rivalry motivates a mechanism of 
checks and balances that preserves economic freedom and in this sense competition as 
a process has an autonomous value independent of its welfare maximizing properties. 
Thus, certain restrictive practices could be justified as long as they do not undermine 
rivalry to an extent, which eliminates the conditions of its own existence.129 This echoes 
the ordoliberal view that certain procedural characteristics of competition should not be 
fully eliminated regardless of any positive or negative consequences.  
Article 102 TFEU reflects a similar ordoliberal concern to accommodate procedural 
and consequentialist goals. Abuse of dominance case law is driven by the objective to 
ensure the competitive process, and thereby enhances both the input- and output-
oriented legitimacy of EU Competition Law. The procedural goal of economic 
freedom, as a central value of the competition-democracy nexus is a leitmotif of 
numerous Art. 102 cases.130 The Court’s case law reflects a two-fold understanding of 
economic freedom that encompasses both the freedom to compete (market access) and 
the freedom of choice of purchasers and consumers. The close relationship between 
these two forms of economic freedom is apparent in the Court’s reasoning on exclusive 
purchasing agreements and rebates. In these cases, the Court repeatedly held that 
exclusive purchasing agreements and loyalty rebates granted by a dominant undertaking 
to its different purchasers constitute anti-competitive practices, for they are ‘designed 
to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to 
deny other producers access to the market’.131 
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The competition-democracy nexus, moreover, materialises in the Court’s concern to 
guarantee fairness and equality of opportunity under Art. 102 TFEU. This ordoliberal 
concern has long been misunderstood by the literature. Commentators ascribed the fact 
that, in contrast to Section 2 of the US Sherman Act, Art. 102 TFEU also prohibits 
exploitative abuses to ordoliberalism’s excessive concern about fairness and its over-
regulatory understanding of competition law.132 More recent contributions, however, 
pointed out that ordoliberalism is mostly concerned with exclusive abuses and that it 
was not the German, but the French delegation, which suggested during the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Rome establishing a prohibition of exploitative abuses of 
dominance.133 On the contrary, the ordoliberal understanding of fairness as equality of 
opportunity calls for tackling exclusionary practices under Art. 102 TFEU. Thus, the 
ordoliberal concern about fairness is directly intertwined with economic freedom, and 
aims at preserving open markets as a level playing field that provides every market 
player with equal opportunities to participate in the competitive process.  
Equality of opportunity plays for instance a role in margin squeeze cases where the 
Court found the said pricing practice as abusive due to its unfair exclusionary effect.134 
In addition, in Deutsche Telekom the Court stressed ‘that a system of undistorted 
competition can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the 
various economic operators’.135 The Court further established a direct link between the 
principle of equality of opportunity and the as-efficient competitor test by holding that 
‘equality of opportunity means that the appellant and its equally efficient competitors 
are placed on an equal footing in the retail market in end-user access services’.136 In this 
respect, the Court is not always confined to the efficiency rationale underlying the more 
economic approach according to which legal institutions in general and EU 
Competition Law in particular should ignore fairness concerns and be exclusively 
guided by welfare considerations.137  
Interestingly, similarly to Art. 101 TFEU, the Court has tried to balance economic 
freedom and fairness with efficiency considerations in abuse of dominance cases. 
Already in Hoffman-La Roche the Court recognised that the procedural goals might be 
restricted in case of an ‘objective economic justification’.138 In British Airways the Court 
clearly recognised an efficiency-based defence akin to the test applied under Art. 101(3) 
TFEU. Accordingly, the objective justification allows the dominant undertaking to 
rebut the presumption of illegality of its conduct by showing that its exclusionary or 
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anti-competitive effect is outweighed by efficiency gains.139 The Commissions’s 
Guidance Paper on Art. 82 underlines that the same four conditions as under Art. 
101(3) TFEU must be fulfilled to allow a practice to benefit from an objective 
efficiency-justification.140 By replicating the fourth condition according to which the 
conduct may ‘not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing 
sources of actual or potential competition’,141 the Guidance Paper acknowledges the 
ordoliberal concern of also protecting procedural aspects of competition so as to 
ensure an effective mix of input- and output-oriented legitimacy. 
In general terms, the competition-democracy nexus which relies on a balance between 
outcome- and process-oriented values could explain the Court’s and Commission’s 
two-fold approach under both articles. First, the authority examines whether a 
deviation from the principle of competition has occurred (restriction of competition) 
and, second, whether such a restriction of competition could be justified.142 By 
contrast, such an approach would not make any sense under a fully-fledged welfarist 
approach: either a business practice restricts consumer welfare and, consequently, is to 
be prohibited by competition rules; or its positive consequences outweigh its negative 
welfare-effects, and it should be allowed. In the latter case, the practice at stake did not 
restrict competition in the first place. 
iii.  A form-based approach towards competition and competition law 
The competition-democracy nexus could also be associated with the Court’s form-
based approach. Under Art. 101 TFEU, the form-based approach is primarily reflected 
in the Court’s reliance on a dichotomy between by-object and by-effect restrictions for 
classifying anti-competitive agreements and practices. The by-object category includes 
agreements that are by their very nature liable to restrict competition.143 Properly 
understood, this concept includes agreements that have a clear and objective purpose to 
restrict competition,144 or that are likely to have a negative impact on competition.145 
This category includes a non-exhaustive list of agreements146 that ‘reveal a sufficient 
degree of harm to competition’.147 Thus, the by-object category does not contain a 
fixed list of practices that could be automatically typified as anticompetitive. It 
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constitutes an open-textured concept grounded on an analytic criterion: does a business 
conduct reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition? Under this criterion, the 
Court classifies obvious hardcore restrictions and inchoate offences under the object 
category.148  
It is important to note, though, that in order to establish a by-object restriction the 
Court engages in a fairly rigorous legal and economic analysis of the agreement.149 As 
already mentioned, the by-object category is not confined solely to certain types of 
agreements. It generally covers agreements where a sufficiently deleterious effect on 
competition may be presumed on the basis of economic analysis.150 As a result, 
determining whether an agreement falls within the by-object category requires from the 
Court to take into consideration the content of its provisions, its objectives and its 
economic and legal context, the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the 
real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question.151 
In other words, demonstrating certain effects is part of an object assessment.152 Hence, 
the restriction by object is not a static notion and the Court does not adhere to rigid 
formalism.  
If a certain agreement falls within the by-object category, there is no need to establish 
its negative actual or potential economic effects on competitors or consumers.153 It is 
not necessary to demonstrate actual distortions of competition or a direct link between 
the agreement and consumer prices.154 It is sufficient to show that the agreement has 
the potential to incur a negative impact on competition having regard to its specific 
legal and economic context. On the contrary, the by-effect restriction refers to more 
blurry and complex violations that require an analysis of the actual and/or potential 
effects of the agreement on the relevant market(s) to be established.155 For an 
agreement to be restrictive by effect it must affect appreciably actual or potential 
competition to such an extent that negative effects can be expected with a reasonable 
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degree of probability on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods 
and services in the relevant market.156  
Given that an examination of the context could be required before it can be concluded 
whether a particular restraint constitutes a restriction by object,157 it can be asked what 
the bifurcation stands for. According to the Court, the difference between the two 
categories ‘lies in the fact that, with a restriction of competition by object, the negative 
interference with market conditions is so clear that the agreement can be presumed, 
without any detailed market analysis, to have a restrictive effect’.158 Under this rationale, 
certain agreements are presumed to be highly capable of reducing the competitive 
pressures in the market, increasing prices above or reducing output below the 
competitive level. Absent an objective justification,159 such agreements should be 
prohibited. If a practice does not fall within the by-object category, its anti-competitive 
potential is not obvious and, thereby, a careful examination of its effects should take 
place. In both cases, the assessment is not formulaic and involves economic analysis. 
Yet, how much analysis should be undertaken when determining whether a particular 
agreement belongs to the one category or the other remains unclear.160 However, 
certain indeterminacy is inherent to such open textured notions and allows the Court, 
as will be shown below, to be responsive to lessons from economics. 
Due to its indeterminacy and, correlatively, because of the legal uncertainty it creates, 
defendants,161 national courts,162 and even the General Court163 have repeatedly 
challenged the Art. 101(1) TFEU bifurcation. Nevertheless, the Court has persistently 
relied on the said tool so as to conduct its competition assessment. This may be 
explained by the fact that judicial decision-making is essentially linked to the use of 
presumptions to channel factual inquiries and economize the need to examine the 
actual circumstances.164 Moreover, since an investigation of the actual effects of an 
agreement demands a more intensive and costly economic analysis, the by-object 
option saves resources, creates legal certainty and allows all market participants to adapt 
their conduct.165  
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Nonetheless, it seems that there is an additional reason supporting the Court’s 
approach. A form-based approach towards Art. 101(1) TFEU aims to identify practices 
that presumptively undermine the competitive procedure. Such practices could distort 
competition as a non-hierarchical process, weaken its procedural values and, thereby, its 
input-oriented legitimacy. If the said practices have the capacity to undermine 
competition as a process, it is also inferred that they have the potential to undermine 
the output-oriented legitimacy of competition. This explains why such practices are 
prima facie prohibited and would be allowed only in virtue of their redeeming virtues.  
By contrast, under the welfarist approach the analytical method adopted by the Courts 
and the Commission should be abandoned and replaced by an in-depth investigation of 
the welfare-effects of the practice at stake. Pursuant to such an approach an 
undertaking’s conduct would be deemed ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-’ competitive solely due to its 
actual consequences on welfare.166 From that perspective, the abovementioned 
bifurcation would be redundant and excessively formalistic since the essential criterion 
should be whether the restraint increases or reduces welfare. Put differently, given that 
the weighing of pro- and anti-competitive effects is left for Art. 101(3) TFEU the 
welfarist approach cannot make sense of the Art. 101(1) bifurcation.167 In this case, a 
fully-fledged welfarist approach would reduce competition law to pure economic 
analysis and eliminate any necessity of striking a balance between the outcome- and the 
process-oriented goals of competition.168 Such a development would transform EU 
Competition Law into an unprincipled area of law totally dependent on empirical 
analysis.169  
The idea of a ‘competition-democracy nexus’ might also contribute to a better 
understanding of the Court’s form-based approach under Art. 102 TFEU. In particular, 
this idea could be used to make sense of persistent concepts such as ‘normal 
competition’ or ‘competition on the merits’, as well as the principle of ‘special 
responsibility’ of dominant undertakings. 
The category of ‘competition on the merits’ or ‘normal competition’ is a key concept of 
the Court’s reasoning under Art. 102. Indeed, the Court defines ‘abuse’ by contrasting it 
with ‘economic performance’,170 which complies with ‘competition on the merits’. Put 
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differently, the Court utilizes form-based concepts to distinguish illegitimate business 
practices ‘from those, which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators’.171 Both the concept of ‘normal 
competition’ and ‘competition on the merits’ embody the emphasis put by the Freiburger 
Schule on the specific procedural form of competition as a non-hierarchical 
coordination process, which is compatible with democratic values. Such an approach 
could reflect the ordoliberal distinction between the categories of ‘performance 
competition’ and ‘impediment competition’. Consequently, the Court relies on form-
based legal presumptions regarding the anti-competitive character of certain categories 
of business practices such as predatory pricing, loyalty rebates, or price-discrimination 
in order to articulate its analytical framework. Thus, based on existing economic 
‘experience’, this approach creates presumptions according to which certain practices 
constitute phenomena of normal economic interaction, whereas others must be 
regarded as having an anti-competitive purpose.172  
Along the same lines, the ordoliberal competition-democracy nexus could explain the 
principle of ‘special responsibility’ of dominant undertakings. In this regard, the Court 
continuously held that the dominant position of an undertaking as such is 
unproblematic under Art. 102 TFEU. However, by having substantial market power a 
dominant undertaking can act independently from certain competitive constraints.173 
Thus, it bears ‘a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market’.174 The ‘special responsibility’ 
doctrine presupposes that the mere existence of dominance necessarily implies that ‘the 
structure of competition has already been weakened, and any further weakening of the 
structure of competition may constitute an abuse of a dominant position’.175 Even 
though such a doctrine could be justified under a welfarist reasoning,176 in the 
European context it was triggered by the ordoliberal concern that the excessive 
concentration and abuse of economic power does not only bear the risk of 
undermining competition, but might also have detrimental political and social 
consequences.  
At this point it becomes apparent that ‘special responsibility’ is closely related to 
‘competition on the merits’.177 Dominant undertakings bear certain obligations limiting 
their forms of participation in the competitive process. Thus, where the competitive 
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process has already been weakened by the existence of dominance, the relevant firm 
should not further undermine the structure of competition. Otherwise, the dominant 
firm would be able to unilaterally change the ‘rules of the game’ by determining the 
number of competitors and the conditions of competition on the market.  
Often in the literature, 178 ordoliberalism is associated with the concept of ‘as-if 
competition’ coined by Eucken179 and Miksch.180 This standard implies that the bearers 
of economic power should behave as if complete competition prevailed.181 Thus, the 
task of the competition authority is to regulate unavoidable monopolies and break up 
avoidable ones.182 Recent contributions have, however, underlined that the ordoliberal 
paradigm is not necessarily linked to the regulatory ‘as-if’ standard. Several ordoliberals 
and disciples of the Freiburger Schule have even criticized the said standard.183 In a certain 
way, the ‘as-if’ standard still resonates in the EU sector regulation of public utilities.184 
Nonetheless, the principle of special responsibility restrains dominant players’ 
opportunity to have recourse to practices, which are not available under competitive 
conditions. In this non-regulatory sense, an (updated) ordoliberal ‘as-if’ standard still 
influences EU Competition Law.185 
This form-based understanding clearly contrasts with the welfarist approach according 
to which the appropriate benchmark for the existence of effective competition is 
independent of the form of the competitive process or the structure of the market. 
Under the welfarist approach, a practice qualifies as abusive only if it inflicts actual or 
potential consumer harm.186 However, in this case the risk of false negatives would be 
increased, since certain exclusionary practices that lessen competition and indirectly 
harm the consumers would be allowed. 
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iv. The adaptive nature of ordoliberalism 
As already mentioned, one of the main objections to ordoliberalism refers to its 
allegedly static and formalistic understanding of competition and competition law 
which goes in tandem with its neglect of economic thinking and welfare 
considerations.187 However, the competition-democracy nexus idea shows that the 
paradigm is not necessarily condemned to economically un-informed formalism. On 
the contrary, this form- and structure-based approach could be informed by economics. 
More importantly, by balancing outcome oriented and procedural goals, the said 
approach takes seriously efficiency considerations without falling into the trap of only 
protecting the ‘right to be efficient’. In this regard, it enhances the democratic 
legitimacy of competition as an institution.  
For instance, in the area of Art. 101 TFEU the Court has articulated a form-based yet 
economically informed framework for protecting competition. As we saw, first, the 
Court investigates whether the agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to 
competition and, thereby, has as its object to restrict competition. In this case, the 
anticompetitive effects are presumed and the analysis moves to the balancing exercise 
of Art. 101(3) TFEU. If the agreement does not have an anticompetitive object, the 
Commission should establish its potential or actual anticompetitive effects. In this case, 
also the defendant can excuse her behaviour by invoking an agreement’s redeeming 
virtues under Art. 101(3) TFEU.  
The analytical categories of anticompetitive behaviour under Art. 101 TFEU are less 
fixed than most literature makes them appear.188 The Court in several cases has blurred 
the distinction between by-object and by-effect.189 Thus, the said bifurcation has not 
discouraged the Court from developing an analytical approach and forging a continuum. 
This function of the bifurcation is often ignored by the literature. Usually the object vs. 
effects debate is approached solely as a disagreement about substantive concepts.190 
Yet, the main function of the bifurcation is procedural. It induces a burden–shifting 
framework for the evaluation of restrictions of competition. According to this 
framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged 
restraint constitutes a restriction by-object by arguing that it has obviously produced or 
intends to produce substantial adverse effects on competition in the relevant market. If 
the plaintiff does not succeed, she may show that the restraint restricts competition by 
its effects. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing either anticompetitive object or 
effect, then the burden shifts to the defendant, who must show that the redeeming 
virtues of the agreement outweigh its actual or potential negative impact on 
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competition. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that 
the anti-competitive effects of the agreement outweigh its pro-competitive effects.191  
This exercise allows the Court to develop the best possible understanding of the case at 
hand.192 These rebuttable presumptions constitute a way for reasonably allocating the 
burden of proof in accordance with categories of practices that are more or less likely 
to bear anti-competitive effects. In this context, the burden of proof is assigned to the 
stakeholder with a comparative advantage at each stage and imposes different 
evidentiary requirements on the parties. Such an approach uses economics as a tool to 
(a) determine the optimal degree of differentiation of competition rules and 
standards,193 and (b) inform competition analysis in specific cases.194 In this respect, 
modern economic thinking is not at odds with the case law on Art. 101 TFEU pursuant 
to which there is no bright line between by-object and by-effect restrictions, but rather 
a continuum. The bifurcation represents different degrees of judicial discretion.195 This 
differentiated judicial discretion is continuously informed by economics. The latter 
effectively indicates what information may be excluded from the Court’s analysis, since 
it is impossible for the Court to consider all circumstances in each case.196  
The above shows that the Court, by interpreting an οrdoliberal provision and without 
abandoning a form-based approach, was able to advance and modify forms without 
being confined to unworkable formalism.197 The Court has also remained apt to modify 
its forms, when they were found unable to capture the complexities of economic 
reality.198 It achieved this development by relying on the said bifurcation and drawing 
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an economically sensitive continuum from by-object restrictions to restrictions by-
effect coupled with a balancing exercise. This continuum, additionally, enabled the 
Court to avoid informality that would significantly expand its discretion and lead to 
arbitrary outcomes.199 Consequently, economic analysis is not an exogenous force to 
Court’s form-based approach. It has been used by the Court in order to flesh out 
assumptions and presumptions and allocate the burden of proof.  
Another example of the adaptive nature of the said paradigm could be found in its 
compatibility with the EU Competition Law’s modernized approach towards vertical 
agreements. Vertical restraints have ambiguous effects on competition: on the one 
hand, they restrict (intra-brand) competition, competitive freedom and autonomy; on the 
other hand, they are in many cases welfare enhancing. Accordingly, it is very difficult to 
say a priori which type of restraints is anti-competitive.200 However, ‘equal freedom for 
all imposes an inherent limit upon the freedom of each and every one and to this extent 
implies a kind of coercion for each and every person concerned’.201 This means that 
certain restraints of freedom of trade are not restrictions of competition, and also that it 
is necessary to distinguish benign from anti-competitive freedom.202  
In this context, the modern approach towards vertical restraints as reflected in the 
Block Exemption Regulation (‘BERs’)203 and the Guidelines204 rejects the claim that 
vertical restraints are per se anti-competitive and calls for focusing on the impact on 
competition and efficiency before any definite conclusion. This approach, thus, 
provides guidance on how to balance outcome-oriented and procedural goals where 
these goals are in conflict.205 From this perspective, certain efficient restrictions of 
competition are acceptable, as long as they do not lead to an excessive concentration of 
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market power or to coercion in the market. The latter should be avoided, as it could 
eliminate the procedural characteristics, which are indispensable for the democratic 
legitimacy of the competitive process. In other words excessive concentration and 
coercion in the market, if not caught, would undermine competition as an institution of 
freedom. In this sense, the modern economically informed approach towards vertical 
restraints is not at odds with ordoliberal thinking.  
In the same vein, an updated understanding of the ordoliberal paradigm shows that the 
Court’s form-based approach under Art. 102 is informed by economic reasoning. This 
is evident, for instance, if we look at the evolving understanding of the concept of 
dominance. The Court has not been satisfied with a static definition according to which 
dominance is identified by an established market share threshold that may allow for 
possible situation-specific deviations. Instead, it uses a comprehensive set of criteria 
indicating that a firm has appreciable freedom from competitive constraints and is able 
to act in ways that a competitively constrained firm could not.206  
In addition, the Court recently specified that the principles of special responsibility and 
competition on the merits are not aimed at protecting less efficient competitors207 and 
that not every exclusionary effect is detrimental to competition.208 On the contrary, the 
Court clarified that ‘competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure 
from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, 
quality or innovation’.209 However, the General Court and the Court recognized the 
limitation of the more economic approach in Intel and Post Danmark II.210  
Specifically, in Intel the General Court concluded that contractual or de facto exclusive or 
quasi-exclusive rebates, even if only applicable to certain market segments, infringe 
Article 102. Thus, the Commission was not required to employ a cost-based test and to 
demonstrate actual foreclosure or consumer harm.211 In this respect, the General Court 
rejected the relevance of the as efficient competitor test in cases of both exclusive and 
loyalty-inducing discounts.212 Given that such conduct had no objective justification 
other than to exclude a rival, it was prohibited under Article 102.213 Even though this 
holding has been starkly criticized as a step backwards towards a form-based 
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approach,214 it could be argued that it is grounded on an economically apt, form-based 
approach. In particular, it sets a clear rule according to which quantity rebates are 
presumptively lawful; exclusivity rebates presumptively unlawful in the absence of an 
objective justification; and the ‘third category’ rebates require detailed analysis.215 In 
addition, the presumption of illegality of loyalty rebates could be economically 
justified.216 
This judgment does not sit uncomfortably with an ordoliberal understanding of 
competition. It shows that, contrary to what is often adduced by the literature,217 the 
ordoliberal categories of exclusionary abuses are not devoid of any economic reasoning 
or theory of harm. The question that ordoliberals are interested in is not whether 
loyalty rebates have positive or negative welfare effects. Instead, they choose a game-
theoretic perspective, looking at the potential effect of a business practice by a 
dominant firm, in this case loyalty rebates, on the available strategies (i.e. choices) of its 
clients and competitors and, eventually, on the process of competition.218  
From this angle, the presumption of per se illegality relies on the observation that a 
dominant firm’s loyalty rebates – as opposed to quantity rebates – are not motivated by 
any underlying economic service in return. On the contrary, such practices have a 
loyalty enhancing ‘suction effect’219 and rearrange purchaser’s incentives and strategies. 
By increasing purchasers’ switching cost the dominant undertaking also raises its rivals’ 
cost and, thereby, might exclude them from the market.220 Being concerned about 
competitors does not automatically mean not being concerned about competition.221 
This becomes apparent, especially, in cases where the dominant undertaking by 
excluding its competitors significantly reduces the competitive constraints in the 
market.222 This underlines that the real challenge is not to replace established categories 
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or forms by a case-by-case balancing of welfare-effects, but to inform these categories 
with new economic content.223 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have argued that the welfarist approach to EU Competition Law fails 
to fully explain the Court’s reasoning in competition law cases and its reluctance to 
abandon its form-based approach. Based on an analysis of the fundamental ideas and 
principles of the ordoliberal school of thought in its historical context, this paper 
illustrated in what sense the ordoliberals perceived a direct link between competition 
and democracy. This competition-democracy nexus materializes in the ordoliberal idea 
of competition as institutional legal framework setting limits to private and public 
economic power in order to guarantee freedom, equality of opportunity and welfare. 
The concept of the competition-democracy nexus as the underlying rationale of the 
said paradigm constitutes a powerful explanation for the continuous influence of the 
ordoliberal school of thought on the Court’s case law. 
Although the Court never explicitly referred to democracy in its case law, its reasoning 
could be explained by an account of competition as a democratic institution. The 
Court’s approach clearly suggests that competition as a specific organizational form of 
the market economy is not to be protected only to the extent that it enhances welfare. 
On the contrary, the protection of competition for the sake of its intrinsic value 
indicates that the Court also recognizes its social and political importance. However, 
competition is by nature a fragile institution that must be protected against companies 
with market power sufficient to defy or even modify the rules of the game. This may be 
the rationale under which the Court protects the competitive process as relying on and 
being conducive to a democratic polity.  
Protecting competition as such, besides its welfare maximizing properties, entails 
certain social costs in terms of efficiency.224 This is seen as a ‘perverse’ outcome within 
a framework that only values outcomes in terms of efficiency. 225 Competitive markets 
like democratic institutions are imperfect; yet they are the best tools we have so far for 
producing the greatest diversity and highest quality of goods and services. In this sense, 
the competitive process has an intrinsic value. From this perspective, the ordoliberal 
paradigm may shed some light on how the Court’s reasoning enhances the input- and 
output-oriented legitimacy of the institution of competition. In this respect, certain 
welfare losses could be deemed as the sacrifice for a democratic and pluralistic 
economic system. 
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